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Abstract—With the evolution of the Internet, multicast 
communications seem particularly well adapted for large scale 
commercial distribution applications, for example, the pay TV 
channels and secure videoconferencing. Key management for 
multicast remains an open topic in secure Communications 
today. Key management mainly has to do with the distribution 
and update of keying material during the group life. Several key 
tree based approach has been proposed by various authors to 
create and distribute the multicast group key in effective manner. 
There are different key management algorithms that facilitate 
efficient distribution and rekeying of the group key. These 
protocols normally add communication overhead as well as 
computation overhead at the group key controller and at the 
group members. This paper explores the various algorithms 
along with the performances and derives an improved method.  
Keywords- Group key management, Key tree, Multicast 
security, Rekeying 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Multicasting is a type of communication between 
computers in a network that enables a computer to send one 
stream of data to many interested receivers without 
interrupting computers that are not interested. For these 
reasons, multicasting has become the favored transmission 
method for most multimedia and triple play applications, 
which are typically large and use up a lot of bandwidth. 
Multicasting not only optimizes the performance of your 
network, but also provides enhanced efficiency by controlling 
the traffic on your network and reducing the loads on network 
devices. This technology benefits many group communication 
applications such as pay-per-view, online teaching, and share 
quotes [3], [4], [6]. 
 Before these group oriented multicast applications 
can be successfully deployed, access control mechanisms [2], 
[9], [13], [19] must be developed such that only authorized 
members can access the group communication. The only way 
to ensure controlled access to data is to use a shared group 
key, known only to the authorized members, to encrypt the 
multicast data. As group membership might be dynamic, this 
group key has to be updated and  redistributed securely to all 
authorized members whenever there is a change in the 
membership in order to provide forward and backward secrecy 
[5], [8]. Forward secrecy means that a departing member 
cannot obtain information about future group communication 
and backward secrecy means that a joining member cannot 
obtain information about past group communication. We 
assume the existence of a trusted entity, known as the Group 
Controller (GC), which is responsible for updating the group 
key. This allows the group membership to scale to large 
groups.  A number of scalable approaches have been proposed 
and one in particular, the key tree approach and LKH [2], [3], 
[10], [19], [20], is analyzed along with its extensions in this 
paper. In short, the key tree approach employs a hierarchy of 
keys in which each member is assigned a set of keys based on 
its location in the key tree. The rekeying cost of the key tree 
approach increases with the logarithm of the group size for a 
join or depart request [16], [17], [18]. The operation for 
updating the group key is known as rekeying and the rekeying 
cost denotes the number of messages that need to be 
disseminated to the members in order for them to obtain the 
new group key. 
Individual rekeying, that is, rekeying after each join 
or depart request, has two drawbacks [12], [14],[19]. First, it is 
inefficient since each rekey message has to be signed for 
authentication purposes and a high rate of join/depart requests 
may result in performance degradation because the signing 
operation is computationally expensive. Second, if the delay in 
a rekey message delivery is high or the rate of join/ depart 
requests is high, a member may need a large amount of 
memory to temporarily store the rekey and data messages 
before they are decrypted. Batch rekeying techniques have 
been recently presented as a solution to overcome this 
problem. In such methods, a departed user will remain in the 
group longer and a new user has to wait longer to be accepted. 
All join and leave requests received within a batch period are 
processed together at the same time. A short rekey interval 
does not provide much batch rekeying benefit, whereas a long 
rekey interval causes a delay to joining members and increases 
vulnerability from departing members who can still receive the 
data.  
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In this paper the existing key management algorithms 
and its variations were deeply discussed. Based on that a new 
hybrid key management technique was devised and its 
performance was analyzed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Simple Algorithm 
In the simple group rekeying scheme, all members are 
connected to a Group Key Controller (GKC). The GKC 
generates and encrypts the group key separately for every 
members of the group. When member join/ leave the group, 
the GKC creates a new key. The GKC encrypts and send this 
new key to every member separately. Here both 
communicational and computational complexity is linearly 
proportional to the group size. This algorithm is not scalable. 
 
B. Key Tree Approach 
In a typical key tree approach [3], [19], [20] as shown 
in Fig. 1a, there are three different types of keys: Traffic 
Encryption Key (TEK), Key Encryption Key (KEK), and 
individual key. The TEK is also known as the group key and is 
used to encrypt multicast data. To provide a scalable rekeying, 
the key tree approach makes use of KEKs so that the rekeying 
cost increases logarithmically with the group size for a join or 
depart request. An individual key serves the same function as 
KEK, except that it is shared only by the GC and an individual 
member. 
 
Figure 1.   (a) key tree structure (b) ID assignment    
   In the example in Fig. 1a, K0 is the TEK, K1 to K3 
are the KEKs, and K4 to K12 are the individual keys. The 
keys that a group member needs to store are based on its 
location in the key tree; in other words, each member needs to 
store 1+logkN keys when the key tree is balanced. For 
example, in Fig. 1a member U1 knows K0, K1, and K4 and 
member U7 knows K0, K3, and K10. The GC needs to store 
all of the keys in the key tree. 
 To uniquely identify each key, the GC assigns an ID 
to each node in the key tree. The assignment of the ID is based 
on a top-down and left-right order. The root has the lowest ID, 
which is 0. For a node with an ID of m, its parent node has an 
ID of (m-1)/k, with its children’s IDs ranging from km+1 to 
km+k, as shown in Fig. 1b. 
 When a member is removed from the group, the GC 
must change all the keys in the path from this member’s leaf 
node to the root to achieve forward secrecy. All the members 
that remain in the group must update their keys accordingly. If 
the key tree is balanced, the rekeying cost for a single 
departing member is klogk(N)-1 message. For example, 
suppose member U9 is departing in Fig. 1a. Then, all the keys 
that it stores (K0 and K3) must be changed, except for its 
individual key. 
 If backward secrecy is required, then a join operation 
is similar to a depart operation in that the keys that the joining 
member receives must be different from the keys previously 
used in the group. The rekeying cost for a single joining 
member is 2logkN messages when the key tree is balanced.  
The efficiency of the key tree approach critically 
depends on whether the key tree remains balanced. For a 
balanced key tree with N leaf nodes, the height from the root 
to the any leaf node is logkN. However, if the key tree 
becomes unbalanced, the distance from the root to a leaf node 
can become as high as N. and also we can’t predict the number 
of rekeying messages. 
 
C. Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) 
In GKMP, initially, the GKC selects a member and 
initiates the creation of a Group Key Packet (GKP). The 
packet contains the Current Group Traffic Encryption Key  
(GTEK) and  a key (GKEK) to deliver the future GTEK. To 
handle future rekeys, the GKC then creates a digitally signed 
Group Rekey Packet (GRP), which consist of the earlier 
created GKP encrypted with the GKEK. When a member 
joins, the GKC selects a member and creates a new GKP 
containing a new GTEK. In addition, it creates a new GRP, 
which is encrypted under the earlier next GKEK. This method 
fails to maintain the forward secrecy when a member leaves 
since every member knows the GKEK[14], [21].  
 
D. Logical Key Hierarchy  
Wong et al. [2] and Wallner et al. [3] independently 
proposed a scalable group key management scheme by con-
structing a logical tree of key encryption keys (KEKs) which 
provides an efficient and secure mechanism to manage the 
keys and to coordinate the key update. LKH does not take into 
account the topology of the network. The LKH employs a 
hierarchical tree whose root node is associated with a group 
key and whose leaf nodes are individual keys of all users in 
the group. The intermediate nodes correspond to Key 
Encryption Key (KEK). Each user in the group holds a set of 
keys on the path from its leaf to the root[1].  
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Figure 2.  A binary logical key tree with eight leaf nodes. 
 Fig. 2 illustrates a rooted binary key tree for a group of 
eight members. Each member is represented in the tree by a 
unique leaf node and is preassigned the individual’s pair-wise 
key with the KS. The inner nodes are associated with auxiliary 
intermediate KEKs, and the root node is associated with the 
group key SEK. The set of keys associated with the nodes 
along the path from a leaf node to the root are assigned to the 
member represented by that leaf node, which include its pair-
wise key with the KS, the intermediate KEKs, and the SEK for 
traffic encryption. For a full and balanced key tree of degree d, 
the member storage is given as 1 + logd N. For example, 
member M1 in Fig. 2 is assigned K3.1, K2.1, K1.1 and K0, in 
which K3.1 is M1’s pair-wise key and K0 is the group key.  
In the virtual key tree each intermediate KEK can be used to 
securely multicast rekey messages to members that are leaves 
of the corresponding inner node’s subtree. Member deletion is 
accomplished by rekeying all the keys possessed by the 
member (except its pair-wise key) as it shares those with 
others. For example, when M1 leaves, K2.1, K1.1 and K0 need to 
be updated. The number of rekey messages is given as Cleave = 
d log
d 
N − 1 [7]. In Fig. 2, d =2 and N =8, the KS needs to send 
the following five rekey messages:  
1. KSÆM2  : {K’ 2.1}K 3.2 
2.KSÆ {M2}   : {K’ 1.1}K’ 2.1 
3. KSÆ {M ,M4} : {K’ 1.1}K 2.2 
4. KSÆ {M2, M3, M4} : {K’ 0 }K’ 1.1 
5. KSÆ{M5, M6, M7, M8}: {K’0 }K 1.2 
 
On user joining, each of the involved keys is updated via 
one unicast (to the new member) plus one multicast (to 
existing members), requiring a communication cost growing 
as Cjoin = 2 logd N. For example in Fig. 2, suppose sometime 
later M1 joins back the seven-member group, the KS then 
needs to send the following six rekey messages: 
1. KSÆM1  : {K’ 2.1}K 3.1 
2.KSÆ {M2}   : {K’2.1}K 2.1 
3. KSÆ M1  : {K’ 1.1}K 3.1 
4. KSÆ {M2, M3, M4} : {K’ 1.1}K 1.1 
5. KSÆM1    : {K’0 }K3.1 
6. KS Æ {M2…..M8} : {K’0 }K0 
In the above approach, each new key is encrypted in-
dividually (one key per message) [1].  
 
E. One-way Function Tree (OFT) 
 Canetti et al. [4] proposed a variation of LKH by 
employing a functional relationship among the node keys in a 
binary key tree along the path from the leaf node representing 
the leaving member to the root. And this scheme is called as 
One-way Function Chain(OFC) [9], [18]. OFC reduces the 
communication overhead from LKH’s 2 log2 N − 1 to log2 N 
by introducing a public pseudo-random function G which 
doubles the size of its input. The left and right halves of G(x) 
are denoted by L(x) and R(x), so G(x)= L(x)||R(x) where |L(x)| 
= |R(x)| = |x|. For example, when M1 in Fig. 2 leaves, the KS 
only sends three rekey messages, from which each residual 
member can compute all and only the keys it is entitled to 
receive as depicted in Fig. 3:  
 
Figure 3.  Key revocation in the one-way function chain scheme 
 
1. KSÆM2   : {r}K 3.2 
 2.KSÆ {M3, M4}               : {R( r) }K 2.2 
3. KSÆ {M 5, M6, M 7,M8,}  : {R(R(r )) }K 2.2 
 
F. Broadcast Encryption-like algorithm 
In "broadcast encryption" schemes a central site broadcasts 
secure transmissions to an arbitrary set of recipients while 
minimizing key management related transmissions. We take 
advantage of such methods in order to improve performance 
for multicast rekeying [8], [16].  
The main difference between broadcast and multicast 
encryption is that the Key Server does not know the identity of 
possible intruders in broadcast scenarios. In the multicast 
encryption problem, on the contrary, one knows which of the 
possible attackers must avoid since the multicast group is 
limited and known a priori by definition.  
 
G.  Iterated Hash Chain (IHC)  
OFC reduces LKH’s communication overhead but it was 
limited to the binary key tree case. We use LKH’s flexible 
structure to OFC and propose the iterated hash chain (IHC) 
that supports trees with degree higher than 2 [10],  [17]. Fig. 4 
presents a ternary key tree, in which there is always a 
functional relationship among the node keys along the path 
from the requesting user to the root. A public hash function H 
is introduced, whose input size and output size both equal the 
key length in the cryptography system.  
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Figure 4.   Key revocation in the iterated hash chain scheme. 
Suppose in Fig. 3 M1 leaves the 27-user group. The 
number of rekey messages is given as Cleave =(d − 1) logdN. 
The KS chooses a key r at random and rekeys K2.1, K1.1 and 
K0 as follows:  
 
1. KS ÆM2   : {r} K 3.2 
2.  KSÆM3   : {r} K 3.3 
3.  KSÆ {M4, M5, M6}  : {H(r)}K2.2 
4.  KSÆ{M7, M8, M9}   : {H(r)}K2.3 
5.  KS Æ {M10,….M18} : {H2(r)}K1.2 
6.  KSÆ {M19,….M27}  :{H2(r)} K 1.3  
Each residual member can then respectively compute all 
and only the keys it is entitled to receive as depicted in Fig 4, 
where the new SEK denoted as K0’ = H2(r) = H(H(r)) is a 
double iteration. In general we have K0’ = Hn(r) where n = 
logd N − 1. Similar to OFC, H should be cryptographically 
strong so that it is hard to find weak iteration keys.  
On user joining, the involved keys are updated via one 
unicast (to the new member) plus several multicasts (to 
existing members), leading Cjoin = 1+logd N. Suppose 
sometime later M1 joins back the secure multicast group, the 
KS then rekeys as follows: 
1. KSÆ M1   : {r} K 3.1 
2.  KSÆ {M2, M3}   : {r} K 2.1 
3.  KSÆ{M4, M9}   : {H(r)} K 1.1 
4.  KSÆ{M10,…M27}   : {H2(r)} K0  
 
H. Synchro-difference LKH (SD-LKH) 
It has been generally accepted and recently proven that 
O(log N) is the lowest overhead achievable by a key man-
agement scheme if strict non-member confidentiality and non-
collusion are required [1]. Recent representative 
improvements and extensions to LKH feature one-way 
functions [4][5] and clustering [11][12]. In this subsection we 
present a novel variation that differs observably from those 
approaches while keeping fully compatible with LKH. The 
proposal is called synchro-difference LKH (SD-LKH) as new 
keys are generated based on previous ones by employing the 
distribution of the difference.  
We reuse Fig. 4 to demonstrate the rationale of SDLKH. 
Suppose M1 leaves the 27-user group. The number of rekey 
messages is given as Cleave =(d − 1) logd N. The KS randomly 
chooses a differential value D and transmits the following six 
messages:  
 
1. KS ÆM2    :  {D} K 3.2 
2.  KSÆM3    :  {D} K 3.3 
3.  KSÆ {M4, M5, M6}  :  {D}K2.2 
4.  KSÆ{M7, M8, M9}  :  {D}K2.3 
5.  KS Æ {M10,….M18} :  {D}K1.2 
6.  KSÆ {M19,….M27}  : {D} K 1.3  
 
On receiving D, each residual member respectively per-
forms XOR operations to compute all and only the keys it is 
entitled to receive: K 2.1‘= K2.1 ْ D, K 1.1’
 
= K1.1 ْ D, and 
K0’ = K0 ْ D. Under the assumption that the generation of D 
is unpredictable by the users, it should achieve the same 
security level with LKH.  
On user joining, the involved keys are updated via several 
unicasts (to the new member) plus one multicast (to existing 
members), leading Cjoin = logd N +1. Suppose M1 joins back 
the group depicted in Fig. 3, the KS then rekeys as follows:  
 
1.  KSÆM1   : { K2.1‘ }K3.1 
2.  KSÆM1   : {K1.1’} K3.1  
3.  KSÆ M1    :{K0’}K3.1 
4. KSÆ {M2,….M }  : { D} K0 27
in which the new value (K’) of each of the keys sent to M1(K) 
is computed as K’= K ْ D by the KS. This still corresponds 
to one-key-per-message rekeying.  
 
III.  BATCH REKEYING 
Individual rekeying is relatively inefficient, especially when 
requests are frequent. To address this, the use of periodic batch 
rekeying was proposed [13] [19]. In batch rekeying algorithms 
join and leave requests are collected during a time interval and 
processed in a batch. Since the KS does not rekey 
immediately, a leaving member will remain in the group till 
the end of the batch period, and a new member will have to 
wait the same time to be accepted. However, this batch period 
can be adapted to dynamics in the multicast group. On the 
other hand, batch rekeying techniques increase efficiency in 
number of required messages thus it takes advantage of the 
possible overlap of new keys for multiple rekey requests, and 
thus reduces the possibility of generating new keys that will 
not be used. 
 
A. Lam-Gouda batch rekeying 
Lam, Gouda et al. [5], [6] presented a very simple marking 
algorithm that updates the key tree and generates a rekey 
subtree. Briefly, their system can be summarized as follows. 
After each rekey interval the KS collects all Join and Leave 
requests and processes them according to the two possible 
cases. 
If the number of leavings is greater or equal than the 
number of joinings, new members are allocated in the places 
of the departed members. Empty leaves are marked as null. All 
node keys in the path from the replaced leaves to the root are 
updated following the rules in LKH.  
If the number of joinings is greater than the number of 
leavings a rekey subtree is constructed with all the remaining 
new members left after applying the algorithm described 
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above. The rekey subtree is allocated under the departed user 
node with the smallest height. 
The algorithm explained in the previous section aims to 
keep the tree balanced through different batches by allocating 
the rekey subtree under the shallowest node in each rekeying. 
However, this rebalancing system is only valid when the 
number of joinings and leavings are very similar; in any other 
case a periodic rebalancing algorithm is needed. 
 
B. Balanced LKH for batch rekeying 
In order to overcome this inefficiency we proposed a new 
batch rekeying algorithm that keeps the tree balanced for 
every batch. The algorithm updates not only node keys but 
also node naming or position, so rekeying nodes can change 
their original position after each batch following a very simple 
rule. 
The KS computerized system does not have much more 
processing load because he only has to update the position of 
the nodes using simple rules. Besides that, keeping the tree 
balanced reduces the total amount of required program 
memory. 
In the other side, the new algorithm slightly increases the 
number of operations to be done by individual members, cause 
they have to know all the time the position in the tree that they 
are occupying in order to update it properly. However, this 
increase is not significant for single multicast members, even 
if they are devices with low computation capability. 
We will briefly describe the atomic steps the KS and the 
individual members must follow to carry out the algorithm.  
1 ) Mark Rekeying Nodes 
In the first step, nodes that should be removed have to be 
pointed out. After collecting the leaving requests, all nodes 
from leaving members leaves to root need to be updated, so they 
are marked for deletion. Notice that no replacement with joining 
members is carried out.  
2) Prune Tree 
The prune action is very simple; it consists in deleting the 
marked nodes and to keep the subtree structures that remain 
unchanged. After this action, the KS has to manage three types of 
elements: remaining subtrees (structures with more than one 
member), joining members and siblings of leaving members. As 
the tree is a binary tree, siblings of leaving members cannot reuse 
any KEK but his individual key, so they should be treated the 
same way as new joining members.  
3) Make New Rekey tree 
Now, the KS has to construct the new rekey tree balanced 
following the next recursive criterion. Group all trees of depth j in 
twos. If any element is left,  group it with tree of depth j+l and 
treat the result as a tree of depth j+2. The criterion must begin 
with trees of minimum depth, that is to say, single elements, and 
be repeated until just only one tree is resulted. 
4) Construct and Send Rekey Messages 
Finally, the rekeying messages have to be sent. These messages 
should include three information fields: destination node, new 
position of destination node and rekeying material. The 
destination node is the node to which sons the message is 
addressed. This field is used by single members to decide 
whether the rekeying message concerns to them or not. The new 
position is the renaming field of the message. Using this 
information, users can rename themselves and their keying 
material.  
The Rekeying material field is the actual data of updated keys, 
calculated, for example, according to LKH. On the other hand, 
the multicast member, basically only has to decide if a multicast 
rekeying message is sent to him, receive it and update his position 
and keying material. 
C.  Lam-Gouda with Improved LKH 
The multicast rekeying consists of three stages: 
initialization, multicasting and recovering. In the first one the 
Key Server generates all the secrets to deliver and sends them 
to the group members. Multicasting stage takes place every 
time a new shared session key is needed, in this stage the KS 
sends by the multicast channel the enough data for the 
authorized members to recompute the new session key, that is 
to say, the recovering stage [6], [12]. 
In Lam-Gouda batch rekeying, members are located in the 
same position of the tree during all the group life. The only 
changes permitted are up and down the tree level if sibling 
members leave the group. In any case, the set of keys that each 
member has from his position to the root is always the same. In 
such scenario, improved LKH can be straightly applied cause the 
only information that members need in order to update the keys is 
r ْ  r'. We will better explain the adaptation of Improved LKH to 
Lam-Gouda Batch rekeying thorough a simple example.  
 
Figure 5.  Case of several leaving processed at a time  
Consider Fig. 5 in which M2 and M6 leave the group. All the 
keys that have been compromised (encircled in Fig.5) must be 
updated. Using Lam-Gouda LKH the length of the next messages 
should be multicasted is 
 
On the other hand, using the improved LKH algorithm the 
message length is   . 
 
D. Balanced Batch with Improved LKH 
In Lam-Gouda [12] with improved LKH we did not allow 
members to change their position during the group life. That is 
to say, they always have the same keys in his path to the root. 
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This allows us the usage of the updating factor (rْr') because 
members only have to know it to change their set of keys. 
Contrary to that, Balanced Batch needs the redistribution of 
reusable subtrees. This does not permit us only to distribute 
the updating factor because usually, after a batch, the key path 
to the root of remaining members will change. This forces us 
to distribute not the updating factor but the updated keys 
themselves, although we can use the same mechanism using 
products of random numbers. This method is expected to 
present worse behavior than Lam-Gouda with improved LKH. 
But, on the other side, it keeps the tree balanced all the time. 
However, performance of such method is better than Balanced 
LKH without improvement mechanism.  
 
IV.  HYBRID TREE KEY DISTRIBUTION 
Since, the number of leaves determines the total number of 
nodes in a tree of given degree, if we can set the number of 
leaves as a variable, then we can control the total number of 
keys. One approach is to cluster the members and assign 
multiple members to a leaf, then by controlling the number of 
members assigned to a leaf node, we can vary the total number 
of nodes in the tree and thus the number of keys stored in the 
GC. We use the hybrid tree model in to develop the design 
algorithm for a given amount of update communication. 
The main idea of the hybrid tree is to divide the group into 
clusters of size M with every cluster assigned to a unique leaf 
node. Then there are N/M clusters (also leaves), and we need 
to build a tree of depth log a(N/M) . Fig. 6 illustrates this for a 
binary tree with cluster size M=3 and a group of 24 members. 
 
Figure 6.  A binary hybrid tree with cluster size M = 3and group size N = 24 
We notice that the structure in Fig. 6 consists of two parts, 
the logical tree, and the clusters. The logical key tree is used as 
inter-cluster key management scheme to limit key update 
communication, and the minimal storage used as the intra-cluster 
scheme to reduce GC storage requirement. 
In the hybrid tree presented in Fig. 6, a user needs to 
store(1+ log a(N/M)) KEK’s required by the logical key tree 
scheme plus one KEK required by the minimal storage scheme 
within the cluster. When a member is deleted, the total number 
of key update messages, denoted by C , is  (a-1) log a(N/M) 
within the tree plus  (M-1) within the cluster, leading to: 
C= (M-1) + (a-1) log a(N/M) 
The number of keys stored by the GC is computed as the 
keys on the tree plus seeds for ( N/M) clusters, which is  
 
 
The last term 1/(a-1) is at most 1 since a≥2. 
Since the logical key tree schemes have logarithmic update 
communication [1], [2], in the hybrid tree model, we want to 
keep the update communication as O(log N) except some scale 
factor β . This can be expressed as: 
  
where the communication scale factor  β indicates how much 
communication can be allotted for key updates.  
 
In the hybrid tree scheme, the storage and the update 
communication are functions of the cluster size M. The 
selection of M should be such that the update communication 
scales at least of the order of O(logN) while the key storage of 
the GC is better than O(N) . Hence the optimization problem is 
posed as min[(1+ a/a-1) N/M] w.r.t. M.  
With this hybrid tree key distribution the key storage is 
reduced greater percentage if the total node is in the order of 2 
20.  The performance is purely based on the cluster size value 
M. We should choose the cluster value based on the 
applications & security requirements. Within cluster the 
communication is very much easier than inter cluster 
communication. And intra cluster communication provide 
tight security than the  inter cluster communication. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
 The table I provide the comparative analysis of the various 
algorithms. From this we can easily understand the importance 
of each algorithm in terms of storage, security, communication 
costs as well as basic properties. From that we understand that 
the hierarchical key tree based algorithms work wells for a 
mildly large group communication networks such as internet 
radio, video conferences and pay per view systems.  
 
 
TABLE I.  OVERALL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Algorithm Properties Comm. costs Secrecy  storage 
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Simple X √ easy √ √ X X n-1 1 n √ √ nk k O(logn) 
GKMP X √ Ok √ √ X X 2 2 New √ X 2k 2k 2k 
LKH X √ easy √ √ √ X d d+1 2d √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
OFT X √ easy √ √ √ X d+1  d+1 d+1 √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn)/2 
Broadcast 
encryption like 
algorithm 
X √ easy √ √ √ X d d+1 2d √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
IHC X √ ok √ √ √ X 1+logd 
n 
1+lo
gd n 
(d − 1) 
logdn 
√ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
SD-LKH X √ easy √ √ √ X logd n 
+1. 
logd 
n 
+1. 
(d − 1) 
logd n 
√ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
Lam-Gouda 
batch rekeying 
X √ easy √ √ √ X d d+1 2d √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
Balanced LKH X √ easy √ √ √ √ d-1 d+1 2d √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
Balanced 
Batch with 
Improved LKH 
X √ easy √ √ √ √ d-1 d+1 2d √ √ O(n) O(logn) O(logn) 
Hybrid Tree 
Key 
Distribution 
 
X √ easy √ √ √ √ (a-1) 
log a 
(N/M) 
N/M
+1 
2N/M √ √ (a-1) log 
a(N/M) 
(1+ log 
a(N/M)) 
(a-1) log 
a(N/M) 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
This study exhibits a clear picture about various key 
management algorithms. The working principles of each 
algorithm along with their drawbacks are deeply analyzed and 
tabulated. From this we can easily identify which algorithm is 
suitable for particular applications. Especially the hybrid key 
management scheme combine the best features from various 
algorithms and try to provide an optimized algorithm which is 
more flexible when compared with other algorithms.  
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